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Abstract Using a multidimensional approach to poverty measurement, this arti-
cle aims to contribute to an improved understanding on the main aspects of
deprivation experienced by former participants of organized crime in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico, a city that became the epicenter of violence due to the ‘war on
drugs’ declared in 2006. A sample of 180 surveys and 20 in-depth interviews
were implemented to evaluate multidimensional poverty amongst young men
serving a prison sentence for a series of crimes related to organized criminal
activity (aged 12 to 29) in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. An equal number of
surveys were implemented to a group of non-offenders who had no criminal
record and resided in a marginalized area of the same city. The research finds
that while offenders fared worse in several non-income dimensions of poverty
compared to non-offenders, qualitative evidence revealed that experiences of
poverty of offenders were not homogenous, as suggested by existing studies.
One of the key findings to emerge from the research is that participation in
organized crime decreases income poverty; however, participation did not con-
stitute an effective nor sustained pathway out of poverty nor did it decrease
deprivation in other dimensions due to a highly skewed distribution of income in
the illegal economy and the use of gains from illegal activity to fuel conspicuous
consumption, findings that are similar in the established Western literature on
youth gangs.
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Introduction
The phenomenon of organized crime in Mexico has been an important subject of
headlines since the declaration of the ‘war on drugs’ launched under the Felipe
Calderón administration (2006–2012). Throughout this period, there has been a noto-
rious increase in the penitentiary population1 and a much publicized herculean effort on
behalf of the state to punish those responsible for crime. In the years spanning from
1995 to 2012, which marked the end of the Calderón administration, the penitentiary
population had more than doubled (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública Federal and
Secretaría de Gobernación in [2]).
The expansion of the prison population did not begin with the ‘war on drugs’. It was
part of a structural change that started with the dismantling of the welfare state in Latin
America in the 1980s and the introduction of neoliberal policies, which reached their
peak in the mid-90s. These policies were accompanied by what the renowned sociol-
ogist Loïc Wacquant described as Bthe criminalization and penalization of poverty^ [3],
in other words, incarceration as a way to for the state to manage poverty. According to
Hathazy and Müller, B…imprisonment expansion—in addition to, and accompanied by
punitive policing— serves to manage and regulate the most unruly sectors of the
informal-criminal economy while reproducing the social hierarchies that emanate from
the triangulation of formal, informal and criminal economic structures^ ([4]: p.16).
There is existing empirical evidence in Mexico that those being punished are not
high-level criminals, but small-time offenders that dangle at the bottom of the organized
criminal hierarchy. Unfortunately, knowledge of the prison population in Mexico is
almost non-existent and does not feature prominently in the academic literature.
Reasons include the exclusion of prison population from census data, the reticence of
Mexican authorities to make data on offenders available to the public, the inherent
administrative difficulty in prison access to work with offenders, and the safety
concerns for researchers working in prison settings. Due to situations of auto-gobierno,
or self-government, in some penitentiary institutions of the country –where powerful
criminals exert some degree of control over prison officials – prison access and work
with offenders can constitute a hazardous affair. As a consequence, not enough work
has been carried out on prison populations in Mexico, nor has this work targeted former
participants or organized crime exclusively. Academic work to understand the condi-
tions of poverty under which former participants of organized crime in Mexico lived
prior to their incarceration is to my knowledge, inexistent. Exceptions of scholarly
work that have assessed socioeconomic conditions of offenders in the country have
looked at penitentiary populations as a whole and have not focused exclusively on
organized crime participants. Moreover, these poverty assessments have conflated
poverty with income and level of education. Given the significant increase in homicide
rates experienced in Mexico perpetrated by organized criminal groups since the
declaration of the war on drugs,2 and given that insecurity and crime constituted the
prime concern amongst citizens in the country in 2014 [6], the absence of this specific
1 During his period in office (2006–2012), there was a notorious investment in the construction of high
security prisons for federal offenders. The original project consisted of the construction of 12 penitentiary
centres [1].
2 Homicide increased in the country from a historic low of 7.8 in 2007 to 22.6 In 2011 [5].
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population from the academic literature is striking. As a consequence, our understand-
ing of deprivations formerly experienced by the penitentiary population is very limited,
as the current evidence lacks the use of a more comprehensive definition of poverty and
lacks qualitative data. This paper will attempt to fill that gap by exploring the
background of this understudied but crucially important population group.
Using Loïc Wacquant’s argument on the penalization of poverty and providing
evidence from the case of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, this article focuses on former
participants of organized crime that were serving a prison sentence at the time of
the fieldwork (October 2014–April 2015) involved in this research. A multi-
dimensional approach to poverty was used to gain a more nuanced understanding
of poverty experienced by offenders. Through material derived from surveys and
interviews, these dimensions are used to compare the findings of this study with
other qualitative research that has taken place in Western settings. To my knowl-
edge, no work on penitentiary populations in the country has yet incorporated a
multidimensional poverty framework. This article will specifically contribute to an
improved understanding on the main aspects of deprivation experienced by former
participants of organized crime in Ciudad Juarez, and will more broadly feed into
a larger discussion on how findings derived from Western settings compare to
evidence from a developing country setting.
This paper is structured as follows: It first presents a contextual section
describing the effects of neoliberalization on imprisonment in the United States
and Mexico, followed by a brief overview of existing work on prison populations
in Mexico. The next section provides a description of multidimensional poverty
and the methodology implemented in this research. An analysis and discussion
section follows, where multidimensional poverty indicators are used as a frame-
work to describe offenders’ experiences of poverty. The article concludes with a
summary of the findings.
Context
Neoliberalization and imprisonment
The implementation of neoliberal policies –which reached their Bgolden age^ at
the end of the 1980’s under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald
Reagan, led to a visible retrenchment of the state in which fiscal austerity, drastic
reductions in the budget of social programs, and privatization dominated the
socio-political scene.3 The latter, coupled with a media frenzy that emphasized
the idea that insecurity and crime were rampant, led to feelings of insecurity
amongst the middle and high echelons of society [7]. To address this anxiety, a
drastic increase in incarceration rates occurred in the United States, a trend which
was not necessarily a response to a rise in crime rates, but instead, as Wacquant
explains, due more to: Bthe extension of recourse to confinement for a range of
street crimes and misdemeanors that did not previously lead to custodial sanction,
3 In the US, there were important reductions in two of the largest social assistance programs -Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and food stamps.
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especially minor drug infractions and behaviors described as public disorders and
nuisances...^ ([3]: p.125) The heightened incarceration rates led to an exponential
growth of the prison population in the US, which rose from 380 thousand in 1975
to half a million by 1980. In 1990, the prison population stood at 1 million and by
1998, it was close to 2 million [3]. At the present time, the United States has the
highest prison population in the world in absolute numbers [8, 9].
Incarceration rates did not affect everyone in the US equally, however. There was a
class, but also a racial component, in the new security policies that were becoming the
norm in some cities of the country. A prime example was New York City, where under
the auspices of Rudolph Giuliani, mayor from 1994 to 2001, and William Bratton,
commissioner of the NYPD from 1994 to 1996, policies of Bzero tolerance^ became
the norm. These policies were based on the Bbroken windows theory ,^ which states that
in order to deter large-scale urban pathologies, crime has to be stopped at its lowest
level [10]. Under the logic Bwhoever wants to steal an egg also wants to steal an ox^ –
an assumption for which there is no substantial empirical evidence – the duo began a
crack-down on crime that saw an unprecedented number of arrests and an apparent
decrease in crime [3].
Giuliani and Bratton were praised all over the world for their success in the
reduction of crime in the Big Apple. Across the Atlantic and down south in Latin
America, zero tolerance began to creep into the political discourse of decision-makers
in the region, mirroring the Manichean view that George H.W. Bush (1989) espoused at
height of the so-called Bwar on drugs^ in the US, when he declared that in order to start
building a safer society, it was necessary first to agree that: B…society itself doesn’t
cause the crime –criminals cause the crime^ (as cited in [11]). And so, a trend in which
a heightened sense of insecurity, coupled with individual responsibility, took prece-
dence in the discourse, side-lining the idea that environmental factors (which the
champions of neoliberal ideology called Bsociological excuses^) contribute to
explaining individual behavior [3]. Under this prevailing structure of thought, poverty
and inequality cannot be blamed for influencing an individual’s personal choice to
commit delinquent acts.
It did not take long for Latin America to adopt this discourse. In a setting where
inequality was and still is rampant (the 10 countries with the highest Gini index in 2012
were all countries from the Latin American region),4 institutions were (and still are)
flailing, and democracy is still relatively young, we took ownership of these ideas –
citing the argument that zero tolerance policies, or mano dura/iron fist policies were a
Bnecessary evil^. Mexico was not an exception. After the country experienced a
devastating financial crisis in 1994, it became the recipient of a significant and much
needed bailout by international institutions. The bailout required to regain stability
came at a price and the Mexican government implemented the Brecommendations^ of
the Washington Consensus to the letter. At the time of the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which of course, boded well with the
introduction of neoliberal polices, crime in the Federal District of Mexico increased
exponentially, from a rate of 1700 crimes per 100 thousand population in 1993 to 2835
in 1995 [12]. Likewise, crimes accompanied by violence increased by 500% in the
period from 1990 to 1996 [13].
4 Latest available comparative data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
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In tandem with the adoption of neoliberal policies in the economic front, the increase
in violence and crime witnessed in Mexico was tackled with the adoption of iron fist
policies.5 As in the case of the US, these translated into higher incarceration rates
throughout the decade of the 1990s, a period in which the Mexican prison population
increased at an average annual rate of 9%, with the most pronounced growth taking
place after 1996 [15]. According to the secretariat of state and the secretariat of federal
public security of Mexico, in the period from 1995 to 2012, the incarcerated population
more than doubled, from 93.6 thousand to 239.9 thousand (as cited in [2]). Today,
Mexico is the country in Latin America with the second largest prison population in
absolute terms, surpassed only by Brazil [9].
One of the significant findings of academic work with offenders in Mexico is that
Binmates are generally not the most dangerous criminals, but they are the poorest^ [15].
According to the results from a sample of more than 800 inmates serving time in eight
federal rehabilitation centers6 - the term used for prisons in Mexico – Azaola and Pérez-
Correa [16] found that almost three fourths of the sample had a secondary school
education or less and only 2.5% of the sample had completed a bachelor’s degree. The
highest percentage (13.6% of the sample) was self-employed, possibly in the informal
sector, followed by taxi driver and trader (comerciante), with 12.4% of the sample
falling into these last two employment areas. The monthly income for 75% of males
serving time in these federal detention centers was between 240 and 12,000MXN (9.44
and 472.44 GBP) [16].7 Any amount below 1242.61 MXN (48.92 GBP) per month on
a per capita basis constitutes extreme poverty, which means that income is insufficient
to buy a basic nutritional basket [17].
An earlier study conducted in 2002 in 15 prisons in the states of Mexico, Morelos
and the Federal District also found evidence that it is the poorest members of society
that end up serving time in prison. For drug-related crimes, for example, the compo-
sition of individuals found in prison were Bnot major drug traffickers, but actually
small-time pushers or possibly, consumers who were arrested with small quantities that
barely exceeded the amount tolerated for personal consumption^ [15]. The authors also
found that almost one quarter of those serving a sentence for theft had stolen less than
1000 MXN (45.8 GBP) and almost half had stolen less than 6000 MXN (275.2 GBP),
leading them to conclude that the Bjustice system concentrates primarily on punishing
property crimes perpetrated by small-time criminals^ [15].
Although this work has been illustrative in providing an overview of the socioeco-
nomic background of inmates in several areas of the country, these efforts have been
5 One of the prime examples of the glorification of these policies is evidenced in the 4.3 million USD paid to
Giuliani and associates for a consultancy to evaluate and issue recommendations for the reduction of crime in
Mexico City. The resulting document is essentially an extrapolation of the policies applied in New York to
manage crime in the most populous city in the world. However, according to Juarez, the implementation of
BZero Tolerance^ policies was faced with important obstacles, starting with the lack of data to the deficient law
enforcement structure that persists and which is evident in the poor selection, training and salaries of the police
force, as well as rampant impunity and corruption (2007). As an example, the starting salary of a police officer
in Mexico City is equivalent to $6 thousand USD. The starting salary for a New York Police Department
officer is $34 thousand USD. See [14].
6 Federal centres house individuals who have been sentenced or are in the process of being sentenced for
federal crimes.
7 Study cited originally mentioned weekly income, which was between 60 and 3000 MXN (2.36 and 118.10
GBP).
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scarce. The first study, which constitutes the first systematic effort to survey the prison
population in federal penitentiary centres [16], is not representative of local penitentiary
centers, which concentrate the largest percentage of prison population in the country: In
2012, there were 420 penitentiary centers, of which 405 were local and only 15 were
federal [1]. The generalisations made from this study are therefore relevant to federal
penitentiary centres; which means that the background of offenders in local institutions
is largely unknown. In addition, the studies mentioned do not measure poverty
according to the criteria established by the National Council for the Evaluation of
Social Development Policy of Mexico (CONEVAL), the official body tasked with
poverty measurement in the country and in charge of producing the Multidimensional
Poverty Index (MPI), which provides a more comprehensive picture of poverty by
measuring six deprivation indicators in addition to income. Instead, these studies have
provided indicators on educational achievement and previous employment and have
lacked a qualitative component that would provide a deeper understanding of experi-
enced deprivations of offenders prior to incarceration. In addition, the work cited above
does not compare the poverty indicators with other population groups, which makes it
difficult to conclusively determine that it is the poorest members of society who end up
in the confines of the prison system. The next section will briefly describe how poverty
is measured in Mexico as well as the methodology used for MPI measurement
implemented in this study.
Defining poverty
This paper strongly argues for conceiving poverty not solely as income-based, but
rather as a multidimensional construct. Currently, Mexico is one of the few countries in
Latin America that produces their own national multidimensional poverty index (MPI)
[18],8 currently calculated by CONEVAL. According to this agency, Mexico currently
has a population of over 120 million inhabitants of which 55.3 million, equivalent to
46.2% of the population, were considered poor and 9.5% were considered extremely
poor in 2014 [19]. Poverty also varies regionally, with the north of Mexico being more
prosperous and industrial, while the south is home to some of the poorest states in the
country, such as Oaxaca and Guerrero, which have poverty rates exceeding 60% [17].
For its calculation, poverty is measured using two income lines: the minimum well-
being line and the well-being line. The first measure considers the per capita monthly cost
of a food basket per person, whilst the second measure considers the per capita monthly
cost of food and non-food baskets.9 The cost of the baskets varies between the urban and
the rural areas.10 Because CONEVAL recognizes that poverty is a multidimensional
8 The other countries in Latin America implementing national multidimensional poverty measurements are
Colombia (2011), El Salvador, Chile and Costa Rica (2015).
9 The non-food basket items include but are not limited to the cost of public transportation, cost of items to
clean the household, cost of items for personal care, cost of clothes, shoes and accessories, among others.
10 For example, an individual is considered poor if her/his income is below 2542.13 MXN (100.08 GBP) per
month, which is the cost of the food and non-food baskets per month in the urban area. For the rural
population, the individual is considered poor if the income falls below 1614.65 MXN (63.56 GBP). An
individual is considered extremely poor if the income falls below 1242.61 MXN (48.92 GBP) per month per
person in the urban area and 868.25 MXN (34.18 GBP) in the rural area. The exchange rate considered is 1.00
GBP= 25.40 MXN.
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phenomenon, six additional dimensions other than income are considered for the classi-
fication of individuals into several categories of poverty. These are: 1) Educational
lagging, 2) access to health services, 3) access to social security, 4) access to food, 5)
quality and spaces of the household, and 6) access to basic services in the household.
Using the six indicators on social deprivation and the corresponding well-being lines,
individuals are grouped into the following categories of poverty, shown in Table 1:
Methodology
The present study involved the administration of 180 surveys containing questions to
evaluate multidimensional poverty among a sample of young male offenders between the
ages of 12 and 29 (definition of youth according to the Mexican Youth Institute,
IMJUVE),11 who were serving a prison sentence in a local12 penitentiary centre in Ciudad
Juárez, located in the state of Chihuahua (in the north ofMexico), at the time of the research.
Ciudad Juárez became the epicenter of the ‘war on drugs’ declared by Calderon and in 2009
was the city with the highest homicide rate in the world due to a turf war waged between
two rival organized criminal groups seeking control of the lucrative territory, which sits
directly at the border with the United States (see Fig. 1). The sample of inmates had been
sentenced for a variety of crimes related to organized criminal activity.13 Twenty in-depth
semi-structured interviews were also conducted amongst a sub-sample of survey partici-
pants to gain a more nuanced understanding of their experiences of poverty.
The sampling in prison used a combination of purposive sampling coupled with
random selection. The aim of the study was to work with young men who had
participated in organized crime exclusively (purposive sampling). A list of offenders
who had been sentenced for offenses related to organized crime was provided by the
director of the correctional facility in which the fieldwork was carried out. Every fifth
person from this list was selected for survey participation. The surveys were adminis-
tered face to face to those who consented to participate by three research assistants
(RAs) and myself. We recorded the answers respondents provided on printed surveys.
Only two candidates were unwilling to participate in the survey.
All 180 survey participants were asked at the end of survey administration whether
they would be willing to participate in a follow-up interview (prison access was
restricted to 2 weeks: in the first week, we conducted surveys, and in the second week
I personally conducted all interviews). From those who consented, RAs and myself
chose 20 participants for in-depth, semi-structured interviews. I instructed RAs to
suggest candidates based on their survey experiences. Each day that surveys were
11 Age group considered youth by the Mexican institute of youth (Instituto Mexicano de la Juventud,
IMJUVE). This study was limited to including young males, the demographic group that perpetrates a high
proportion of crime in Mexico.
12 The shortcomings of research in federal institutions have been previously addressed.
13 Law against organized crime (Ley federal contra la delincuencia organizada) in Mexico considers that when
three or more individuals have organized to execute - in a permanent or systematic way - a series of crimes,
they will be sanctioned as members of organized delinquency. The crimes considered in this research were: 1)
crimes against public health –which included 1.1) transport and possession of drugs, 1.2) distribution, 1.3)
consumption and/or 1.4) cultivation, among others; 2) crimes related to arms-trafficking; 3) others form of
organized delinquency including human trafficking; and 4) theft. The study also considered individuals
sentenced for crimes such as: 5) kidnapping, 6) extortion; and 7) homicide related to organized crime.
Penalization and multidimensional poverty: improving our... 627
conducted in prison in the first week, RAs and I would discuss the candidates that they
had deemed suitable for interview and the reasons for their suitability. We discussed
criteria such as openness in the survey and skimmed the surveys we had administered
to selected candidates. Unfortunately, because prison access was a time-sensitive issue,
I was unable to input all of the data from the surveys and carry out preliminary analyses
that would have allowed for a more sophisticated interview selection process. Based on
the recommendations of RAs, final candidates that fit some of the study’s assumptions
(deprivation was apparent along multiple dimensions) as well as those that were
Table 1 Categories of poverty according to the multidimensional poverty index
Categories of Poverty Definition
Extreme multidimensional
poverty
Population with an income below the minimum well-being line –meaning
that income is insufficient to purchase the food basket, and deprived in
three or more of the social indicators just described.
Moderate multidimensional
poverty
Population with an income below the minimum well-being line, meaning
that they cannot purchase the food basket, and deprived in one or two of
the social indicators.
Multidimensional poverty Population with an income below the well-being line –meaning that
income is insufficient to purchase both the food and non-food basket
items, and deprived in at least one of the six social deprivation indica-
tors
Vulnerable due to deprivation in
social indicators
Population that presents deprivation in one or more of the social indicators
but has an income above the well-being line.
Vulnerable due to income Population that presents no deprivation in social indicators but whose
income is below or equivalent to the well-being line.
Not poor and not vulnerable The population whose income is above the well-being line and who also
show no deprivation in terms of the social indicators.
Source: Elaborated by author based on information from CONEVAL
Ciudad Juarez
Fig. 1 Map of the United States-Mexico border. Source: Brown University, Forgotten Histories of the U.S.-
Mexico Border, 2015
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outliers (those who did not show deprivation) were selected. I conducted all interviews
face to face in the selected prison. Each interview lasted between 45 min to an hour.
An equal number of surveys (n = 180) were also administered to a comparison group
of young men in the same age group (12 to 29) who had no self-reported prior criminal
record and who resided in a marginalized area of Ciudad Juarez (Felipe Angeles).
Access to this population was obtained by a trusted member of the community who was
a football coach for young men in the area of the city where data was collected. He
facilitated access to candidates willing to participate in the study. Because he had a
close relationship to most of the young men who participated in the survey, he could
corroborate that participants had not engaged in delinquent activity.
For the evaluation of multidimensional poverty, I sought to maintain the same
questions included in the national survey on income and expenditures (Encuesta
Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos del Hogar, ENIGH), which is used to generate the
multidimensional poverty index in Mexico. For income, delinquent respondents were
asked about the number of members in the household where they resided prior to
incarceration and to indicate an income range for the household14; non-delinquents
were asked about the household where they resided and income range at the time of the
data collection. This figure was divided into the number of members to determine
whether the individual was poor or extremely poor by income standards. The other six
indicators, included in the MPI measurement - educational lagging, access to health
services, access to social security, quality and spaces of the household, access to food,
and access to basic services in the household, were assessed according to questions
drawn from the ENIGH survey (see Table 2 for criteria to establish deprivation below).
Survey questions for the non-delinquent sample were the same; the only difference was
that delinquents were asked about deprivation experienced prior to incarceration and
non-delinquents about deprivation at the time of the data collection. For the interviews,
respondents were asked to elaborate on their experienced deprivations.
Analysis of data and discussion
Comparison of data indicates that the offender sample fared worse along five of the
dimensions considered in the multi-dimensional poverty analysis, finding that those in
the confines of the prison system were more deprived in access to health services,
access to social security, quality of the spaces of the household, access basic services,
and had a higher share of educational lagging. However, they were less deprived in
income and in access to food. The following graph summarizes the proportion of
deprivation in the delinquent population sampled along the dimensions previously
discussed, comparing results to the sample of non-offenders (Fig. 2).
Despite these deprivations amongst offenders, qualitative evidence from the in-depth
interviews finds that deprivation was not experienced homogeneously across delin-
quents. For example, while at least three out of the 20 interview participants described
experiences of extreme poverty, at least six participants indicated that they did not feel
14 Income ranges were calculated using data on income deciles for households according to the ENIGH
survey. This method to determine income has been used in other national surveys. For example, see the
national youth survey, Instituto Mexicano de la Juventud (IMJUVE), Encuesta Nacional de Juventud 2012.
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they grew up deprived. One respondent who grew up in extreme deprivation belonged
to an indigenous group residing in the Tarahumara mountains. Gabriel,15 who lived
with his nine siblings, described having no access to basic services and struggling at
times to pay for foodstuffs prior to his incarceration. He described that when working as
a day laborer, for example, he was earning a daily wage of MXN $120 (GBP £4.76) for
picking fruits and vegetables. When asked whether he had access to basic services, he
summed up his situation as follows:
15 All names have been changed for the protection of study participants.
Table 2 Poverty indicators used to calculate MPI and deprivation criteria
Poverty indicators Deprivation if…
1. Income* Income was below the well-being line or below the minimum
well-being line. The well-being line is established in urban areas at
MXN $2542.00 (GBP £100.83) per capita on a monthly basis. For
the minimum well-being line, the figure is MXN $1614.65 (GBP £
64.07).
2. Educational lagging Participants did not complete secondary school or were not enrolled in
any educational programme at the time of the study
(non-delinquents) or prior to incarceration (delinquents)
3. Access to health services No access prior to incarceration (delinquents) or at the time of the study
(non-delinquents) via any of the providing institutions mentioned.
4. Access to social security If they failed to answer positively to at least one of the three questions
concerning access to social security prior to incarceration
(delinquents) or at the time of the study (non-delinquents).
5. Quality and spaces of the
dwelling
The dwelling where respondents resided prior to incarceration
(delinquents) or at the time of the study (non-delinquents) had any of
the following characteristics:
-Main material of the floor is earth
-Roof made from waste, cardboard, metallic or asbestos plates or straw
-Material of the walls made from clay; bamboo, palm or reed; carton,
metal or asbestos plate; or waste
-more than 2.5 occupants per room in the household
6. Access to food* There was a positive answer for the items indicating moderate and
severe food insecurity.
7. Access to basic services and
household appliances*
The dwelling where respondents resided prior to incarceration
(delinquents) or at the time of the study (non-delinquents) presented
at least one of the following characteristics:
-Water obtained from a well, river, lake, stream, or tubed water brought
to the dwelling from another house, public fountain or hydrant
-The dwelling did not have drainage or the drainage is connected to a
tube that leads to a river, lake, ocean or crevice
-The dwelling did not have electricity
-The fuel used to cook or heat food items was firewood or carbon
-Household did not have access to either a refrigerator, washing
machine, or both
*Indicates those that have been altered from the original indicators developed by CONEVAL
Source: Elaboration by author
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Well, we were always humble. We never had anything. We were…didn’t I tell
you that we had a hole in the ground outside for a bathroom? There was no
drainage, there was no light. Gradually, we have built our house.
Another respondent, Alfredo, who had worked as a hired assassin, remembered
growing up in abject poverty, not having money for buying a pair of shoes. He
described that he and his siblings would walk around barefooted, without sandals, for
months. At times, they would not even wear shirts, just some sort of underwear
garment. Although these cases highlight extreme poverty, not all interview participants
shared these experiences. For example, when asked about his economic situation and
whether he grew up feeling deprived, Jorge described his situation as follows:
Not really, I told you. Deprived? No. On my father’s side of the family, well,
thank God they are well off economically. And because I am the favorite
grandson, I was given everything…and my mother too, well, she was practically
killing herself to provide for us…when I was young, thank God, I never lacked
shoes, or clothes…
In another interview, Pedro mentioned that he abandoned school not due to income
constraints (the main reason why school abandonment occurs in Mexico, see [20]), but
rather because he wanted to have a stable income for the independence that it
represented. Juan José also mentioned that although he did not feel he grew up
deprived, although he did mention that his parents would refuse to give him money
to buy ‘lujos’, or luxury goods.
Classifications of respondents into the different categories of poverty confirms that
poverty was not homogenously experienced: Most individuals in the delinquent sample
were categorized as ‘multidimensionally poor’, meaning that prior to their incarceration
they had an income below the well-being line (income was insufficient to purchase both the





































Fig. 2 Percentage (%) of deprivation along MPI dimensions, comparison for delinquent and non-delinquent
samples. Source: Author’s elaboration from own dataset and data from CONEVAL. * The samples are only
representative of adult population and exclude respondents aged 12 to 17
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food and non-food basket of basic items) and were deprived in at least one of the six
deprivation indicators. However, there were also individuals belonging to other categories
of poverty: More than one quarter of respondents were ‘vulnerable due to deprivation in
social indicators’ (26.5%), meaning that they were deprived in one or more of the social
indicators but had an income above the well-being line, and almost one fifth were in
‘extreme multidimensional poverty’ (18.9%), meaning that they could not afford to pur-
chase a basic food basket and were deprived in three or more of the indicators. There was
also a small percentage who were found to be ‘not poor and not vulnerable’ (4.6%), who
had an income above the well-being line and who showed no deprivation in terms of the
indicators (see Fig. 3).
Income deprivation and conspicuous consumption
One of the often cited explanations of the appeal of participating in organize crime in
Mexico is economic [21]. The comparison of income deprivation across the delinquent
and non-delinquent samples reveals that delinquents are in fact less income deprived than
non-delinquents, suggesting that participation in organized crime is reducing income
poverty. While 72% of delinquents were poor by income standards, for the non-
delinquent sample, the figure was 86.9% (see Fig. 2).
In interviews, participants who had participated in organised crime confirmed obtaining
significantly higher amounts in the illegal economy in comparison to their earnings in legal
employment. Data in Table 3 summarises the proceeds of organised criminal activity and
compares them to formal and informal employment: Guillermo, for example, mentioned that
he would make a daily wage of between MXN $2000.00 and $3000.00 (GBP £79.33 and
£119.00) through participation in delinquent activities.16 In comparison, when he held a job in
public transportation, he was making a daily wage of only MXN $83.33 and $100.00 (GBP
£3.30 and £3.97), which means that the proceeds of crime were between twenty and thirty
times greater than the daily wage in his formal job. Rodrigo mentioned making between
MXN $5000.00 and $10,000.00 (GBP £198.33 and £396.67) on a weekly basis in organised
crime related activity, while in a construction job he made one-tenth or less than that amount.
Despite the disparity in earnings between formal employment and organised crime
related activity shown in Table 3, it is important to bear in mind the following observa-
tions. First, income gains made from participation in the illicit economy are insufficient to
have an impact on income distribution. Despite suffering from less income deprivation, a
large proportion of the delinquent population still belongs in the income deciles that
control a very small proportion of total income. Figure 4 illustrates the proportion of the
total national income received by each decile of the Mexican population, where the first
decile is the poorest and the tenth decile is the richest. Data from the ENIGH survey
reveals that at the national level, the two highest income deciles receive more than 50% of
total income17 and the two lowest income deciles only receive less than 5% of total
16 The exchange rates mentioned throughout the thesis correspond to the exchange rate between the Mexican
Peso (MXN) and the British Pound (GBP) at the time of the writing, which spanned from 2014 to 2017.
Throughout this period, the exchange rate has fluctuated between a low of MXN $22.92 =GBP £1.00 and a
high of MXN $25.2 = GBP £1.00.
17 According to data from the ENIGH survey, total income for 2012 was estimated at 1199245100 MXN. This
was divided by the income estimated for each decile, to come up with the proportion of total income (%) that is
controlled by each income decile.
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income. Of the delinquents sampled, almost half (41.5%) belong to the lowest two income
deciles.
Second, participation in this type of crime is neither stable nor constant. While a
significant amount of money is made from illicit activity (e.g. through kidnapping), it is
unlikely that this happens frequently enough to represent a stable income. Second, there
is evidence that incomes earned depend on the individual’s position in the hierarchy of
organised crime, meaning that there are significant disparities in the income gains for
those at the top of the hierarchy in comparison to those at the bottom. While no data is
available on the distribution of profits in organised criminal groups in Mexico,
Muehlmann’s ethnography of Mexican narco-culture on the US border documented
evidence of a ‘routine exploitation to which the lower-level participants in the drug
trade are subjected to’ ([23]: p. 80). According to Azaola and Bergman [15], the
literature on offending populations in Mexico illustrates that those who end up behind
bars are usually small-time drug peddlers, not the most dangerous or prosperous
dealers. Although part of the reason is rooted in the unfairness of the justice system
in Mexico -meaning that those who can’t buy justice, seldom obtain it, it is also the case
that most participants of organized crime do not manage to reach top-level positions in
the organized crime hierarchy that would allow them to escape poverty.
Valuable insights from research on youth gangs in other contexts provide further
evidence that skewed distributions in profits corresponding to position in the hierarchy
of the criminal structure are common. In a research on youth gangs in London, Densley
[24] found that Bincome variation between elders and youngers (terms used to denote
hierarchy within the gang) appears ‘highly skewed’ B (p.57). According to his study,
one elder gang member, who occupied a more ‘senior’ position in the gang, indicated
that those below him would get a weekly wage of approximately GBP £500.00, while
the real weekly proceeds of the drug sale would amount to around £5000.00 or
£6000.00, meaning that those in the lowest tier of the gang were only getting a ‘10%
cut’ (p.57).
Densley compares gangs to multi-level marketing, which he explains is
Bintrinsically flawed, yet it appeals because it sells the dream of material wealth and
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Fig. 3 Percentage (%) of delinquent sample according to different classifications of poverty. Source: Author’s
elaboration from fieldwork dataset
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independence and appears to be outside the mainstream of business as usual^ ([24]:
p.80). This is very similar to the ‘sales pitch’ that street gangs and organised crime use
when they are recruiting youngsters to participate in the illegal economy (p.80).
Densley points out that Bwhat both groups fail to advertise is that the system benefits
the few over the many. For every gang younger who makes a decent living or even a
decent supplementary income from drug dealing, there are countless others who do
little more than break even^ (p.80). If the illegal drug economy in Mexico does
generate an estimated yearly revenue of between 30 billion [23] to 50 billion USD
[25], constituting between 3 to 4% of the country’s GDP and employing more than
three times the number of people than the nationally-owned petroleum giant, Petroleos
de Mexico, PEMEX [26], then the findings from Densley’s study can only ring as true
in the Mexican setting. Let’s not forget that more than 70% of delinquents who had
participated in organized crime in this sample were still income poor, a high share of
delinquents belonged to the lowest income deciles and more than a quarter were
vulnerable due to deprivation in social indicators. This finding corroborates well the
reality of organized crime participation: BEso de que todo aquel que entra al narco se
hace rico, es nomás un pinchi mito^ [the idea that all who participate in narco-
trafficking become wealthy, is only a *** myth] [27].
In an interview conducted by a Mexican journalist, a participant of organized
crime from the city of Culiacán -one of the prime ‘hot-spots’ of organized criminal
activity, revealed that 70% of those who participate in this type of criminal activity
are very poor, and most of the money they make from the trade is spent on drugs
and alcohol. This perhaps explains why despite less income deprivation, more
than one quarter of respondents were vulnerable due to social indictors, meaning
that although they had an income above the well-being line, they were still
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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Fig. 4 Proportion (%) of Total National Income Received by each Decile, Mexico. Source: Author’s
elaboration. Note: Proportion calculated based on information from ENIGH survey, households and current
total trimestral income
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deprived in one or more of the social indicators. This shows that the gains in
income from illicit activity were not used to decrease poverty in other dimensions,
for example, to access health care or to decrease educational lagging. Evidence
from the interviews in this study confirmed that spending the proceeds derived
from illicit activity on material items was prevalent. For example, Juan José
described how Balcohol consumption, partying, wanting to be well dressed, want-
ing to have a car, having, I don’t know, jewelry…you know, looking good,^ were
motivating factors for criminal participation, findings that fall in line with other
studies of marginalized urban youth. MacLeod’s study of young, poor, men
residing in the projects of Massachusetts pointed out that ([28]: p.48) access to
things like Bbeer, sneakers and joints^ were important and in his ethnography of
youth gangs, Densley recalled witnessing ‘bedrooms adorned with large flatscreen
televisions and stacked ceiling-high with boxes of Nike shoes’, [24]. For Ander-
son [29], the fashion imperative of the Philadelphia street youth were Timberland
boots and gold chains. According to Shover and Honaker the intense concern of
offenders with outward appearances, with ‘looking good’, is derived from a strong
attachment to the values of street culture, values that place great emphasis on the
‘ostentatious enjoyment and display of luxury items’ ([30]: p. 283). In his study of
street culture in Philadelphia, Anderson has referred to fashionable clothes as
sources of esteem and respect [29].
For the marginalised youth of Ciudad Juarez, the coveted luxury items are consti-
tuted by the apparel worn by the elite, the middle and high-class Mexicans. These
clothes, referred to as ‘ropa fresa’ [preppy clothes] in some interviews, are best
exemplified with clothes bearing the Polo, Abercrombie & Fitch, and Hollister logos.
However, these are not representative of ‘street’ culture; instead, subjects are subscrib-
ing to the fashion statements set out by the affluent class of Mexico. According to the
Mexican National Survey on Discrimination (ENADIS), lacking economic resources
was the main reason cited for which individuals had felt their rights had not been
respected, followed by physical appearance [31]. In Juarez, the imitation of consump-
tion patterns of the elite, a class that commands respect, represents a mechanism to
prevent discrimination based on appearance. As Raphael [32] explains, in Mexico,
wearing certain labels constitutes a Bpassport^ to enter a particular social group. In this
case, it symbolically reduces the distance between the class that is discriminated (the
poor) and the class that commands respect (elite). It is not surprising to see that one of
the most notorious drug leaders was wearing a green shirt with the distinctive logo of
the Polo brand when he was arrested (see Fig. 5). According to Veblen [33], there are
many ways to show that one is wealthy, but clothes and accessories, in contrast to other
material items, can be shown off on any occasion and it is difficult for them not to be
noticed by observers.
Along with the emphasis on outward appearances, spending the proceeds of
illicit crime on drugs was also not uncommon, a finding that has been documented
widely in other work with young gangs in Western contexts, including Bourgouis’
work with crack dealers in Harlem [34], Densely’s work with youth gang members
in London, the ‘street’ youth of Philadelphia that feature in Anderson’s work, as
well as the armed robbers who star in Decker and Wright’s ethnography of armed
robbers. In this study, several interview participants in Juarez mentioned using
drugs frequently and a couple of others admitted having a strong addiction to
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several substances. Family members who used drugs or were themselves involved
in the drug trade was also a common phenomenon. In an interview with Milán, he
described his father had a cocaine addiction and used on a daily basis, and
eventually he and his brother also picked up the habit. When he was involved
in crime, he used some of the proceeds of crime to buy alcohol and cocaine. Jorge
for example described that his family was involved with drug trafficking. He
started to use heroin, cocaine, and Ball types of drugs^. Initially, he described that
consumption was sporadic but eventually became an addiction. He was doing
drugs on a daily basis. Manuel, described that although his family –he lived with
his grandparents, was not in a difficult situation economically, he felt the need to
work to sustain his addictions. BI worked only for my drugs and to be clothed,
‘andar bien’ […]^ BI started to consume marihuana and alcohol, tobacco…and
well, whatever my family gave me, it wasn’t enough […]^ Although the levels of
drug use in Mexico and the US are drastically different -with prevalence rates
estimated at only 2.3% nationally in 2001 [35], there is evidence that consumption
among youth and especially young people who live close the US border, have a
higher prevalence of drug use ([36]).
The motivation behind using the income derived from illicit activities to foster
conspicuous consumption and to live a fast life is succinctly summarized by what
a participant of organized crime in Mexico expressed to a journalist in an
interview in 2010: ‘prefiero vivir dos años como rey que toda la vida como un
wey’ [I would rather live 2 years like a royal than my whole life like a fool]. As
Wright & Decker point out in the criminal universe, Bthere is no reputational
mileage to be gained through deferred gratification^ ([37]: p.37). That organized
crime does not constitute a pathway out of poverty or an overall improvement in
other dimensions of deprivation is however an important message to communi-
cate: in personal communication with a specialist on education in Mexico, there is
evidence from rural schools in states where organized crime is rampant that young
students openly aspire to be narco-traffickers when they grow up ([38]); B[…]
hopefully with a fleet of SUVs and plenty of women^ ([39]: loc. 2941).
Source: Google images
Fig. 5 The arrest of Edgar Valdéz. Source: Google images
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Deprivation in non-income indicators
Exploring other indicators beyond income, the data indicates that there is a
significant disparity in educational lagging when comparing both groups: almost
half of the delinquent sample (47.2%) were lagging in education, meaning that
they had not completed secondary school and were not enrolled in any educational
programme prior to incarceration. This figure is more than three times the pro-
portion for the non-delinquent sample, where educational lagging was present in
only 15.6% of respondents. Furthermore, five out of eight delinquent respondents
in the age group 12 to 15 were not enrolled in school prior to incarceration and for
those aged between 16 and 29, almost half (46.8%) indicated that they had not
completed secondary school. Although the most recent report on school abandon-
ment cites income constraints [40, 41] as the main motivation for abandoning
school, as was previously pointed out, income constraints were higher amongst
non-delinquents, meaning that economic constraints cannot explain the disparity
in educational lagging across both groups.
The literature on school abandonment in Western contexts, largely the United
States, indicates that the reasons why students drop out of school may have a lot to
say about their engagement in crime. While dropping out of school to assume adult
roles (employment, marriage and/or parenthood) predicts a lower likelihood of
participation in crime, poor educational performance has been associated to school
abandonment and delinquency [42, 43], meaning that those individuals who drop out
of school due to poor performance in school are more at risk of participating in
delinquent acts.
The present study first found that almost half of offenders sampled already had
parental responsibilities, and some had started families since the age of 14, which
contrasts with the finding that assuming parental roles decreases the likelihood of
criminal engagement. Rather, the pressures to provide in a culture where men are still
expected to be the main, if not the sole breadwinners, can act as a catalyst for criminal
participation. In addition, it was found that the respondents who were serving time in
prison had performed well in school (only 24% of respondents expressed that they
Bhighly agreed^ and Bagreed^ with the statement Bmy grades in school were usually
low^), and hence low educational achievement was not the reason that they were
dropping out, nor could poor performance in school explain their engagement in
delinquency. A recent study of school abandonment at the secondary level in Mexico
found that the second most important reason for dropping out amongst students
surveyed in the country was a strong dislike for school ([20]).
In additional analyses, I found that those who agreed more with the statement Bthe
things I was taught in school were not very useful^ had a higher probability not only of
abandoning school, but also of participating in delinquent activity [44], providing
evidence that a dislike for school and not finding the material taught useful may be
more decisive factors in explaining dropping out and engagement in delinquency than
academic achievement. This was further corroborated in the interviews, where over half
of delinquents pointed out that they dropped out of school due to an inclination for
‘andar en la vagancia’, or a preference for hanging out with their peers. In an interview
with Milán, he recalls his experience at school in the following way (CC denotes
author, P is for interview participant):
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CC: Until what grade did you study?
P: Until primary...until fifth grade.
CC: What was the reason (for dropping out)?
P: Wanting to hang out. Sometimes I would not show up (to school), sometimes I
would...but I would leave the school.
CC: What was it about school that you didn't like?
P: Nothing, I didn't like anything about it.
CC: Were the teachers bad?
P: No, well no, I would just go and sit...I remember, yes, I remember well. I
would just go there and sit in the chair...I would not listen.
CC: How did you feel at school?
P: Weird.
In another interview, Ricardo is asked what he disliked about school: BIt’s just that it
was a long time. It had been 6 years (he dropped out after sixth grade), one starts to grow
up and likes the street more than school.^ [On the street] Bno one is there watching out
for what you are doing or anything, you make your own law [...] B. Manuel also
confirmed that he quit school because Bhe didn’t like it anymore^ and because he
preferred to be out on the street, Bandar de vago^, an often cited phrase by interview
participants. Jorge mentioned that he dropped out of school due to a drug habit and Juan
José mentioned that he Bdidn’t study because he didn’t want to, because he never liked
school^, recalling that he spent the money his parents gave him for tuition in night clubs
and alcohol. Other respondents mentioned having discipline problems in school and
being expelled. For example, Pedro mentioned that he performed well in school and had
Bgood grades^, but he liked trouble and had disciplinary issues. He was expelled from
three different schools. As Bourgouis explains, the formal institutional vacuum that is
created by truancy [and some cases, being expelled from the school system] is filled by a
‘proto-criminal youth crew, a gang’ in the context of Harlem, by ‘street’ people in the
context Philadelphia [29], and by ‘vagos’ in the case of Juarez. What all groups share is
their immersion in urban poverty and a generalized attitude of dislike for school.
It was surprising that given the regional differences in poverty between the north and
the south of Mexico –with the north (where the state of Chihuaha and Ciudad Juarez
are located) being significantly more prosperous, close to one half of respondents in the
delinquent sample of this study had experienced deprivation in access to food: more
than 40% of respondents had been in a condition of moderate or severe food insecurity
prior to their incarceration; for non-delinquents the share of deprivation in access to
food exceeded 50%. It is interesting to note that the protagonists of the Western
literature relied on social welfare to access basic goods. Not one qualitative study
640 Villegas C.C.
reviewed made mention on critical deprivations in access to food among participants.
In Mexico, instead, social programs promoted by the government, such as the program
BSin Hambre,^ have been ineffective in fulfilling their purpose –to eliminate hunger
amongst people in extreme multidimensional poverty through an adequate nutrition.
Although data for the state of Chihuahua, where Ciudad Juarez is located, indicates that
127 communitarian dining halls were set up under the program [45], there is no data to
effectively evaluate the impact of the program in reducing the number of individuals in
a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity.
In contrast to discouraging indicators in terms of income and education, delinquent
and non-delinquent sample offenders were found to have lower shares of deprivation in
access to social security (38.5 and 20.4% are deprived, respectively), when compared
to deprivation at the national level (which was almost 60% in 2014). One of the
plausible explanations for high enrolment of both delinquents and non-delinquents in
the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) -which employers are not forced to
provide – is that a high percentage of the inhabitants of Ciudad Juárez work in
maquilas, or assembly plants. According to Ávila, the industry employed 272,702
workers in 2015, in a city of roughly 1.3 million inhabitants [46].
Additional questions on employment before participation in illicit activities found
that one of the most common jobs carried out by offenders was precisely in the maquila
sector. Around 32% of the delinquent sample signalled that they had worked at some
point in the assembly plants, most of them in the role of operadores. Access to social
security provided by employment in the maquila is, however, insufficient: the weekly
salary for the lowest level of employment in the assembly plant –as an operador –is
estimated at a meagre 500 to 800 MXN (19.6 GBP to 31.5 GBP) [44]. According to the
national poverty line, an individual is considered poor if his income in an urban area is
below the cost of a basket of food items and a basket of non-food items, roughly
equivalent to a monthly amount of $2542.13 MXN (116 GBP) per capita. A weekly
salary of under 600 MXN, the median salary of the maquila employee fulfilling the role
of operador, falls below the poverty line. In contrast, the minimum wage in the US is
currently 7 USD per hour. Despite these stark differences, some of the protagonists of
Wright & Decker’s work agreed that they did not see themselves holding down a job,
nor did they want to: some of the armed robbers resented receiving orders from a boss
as well as the low wages accompanying the low skilled jobs they could perform. In
Bourgouis’ work, Harlem crack dealers had held jobs in office environments where
they were subjected to constant discrimination, eventually giving up those jobs entirely.
While discrimination and low wages constitute important contributing factors to work
outside the legal economy, it is clear that the constraints in the Mexican context are and
will continue to be far more severe. Despite that, all delinquent respondents had
occupied at least one form of employment prior to incarceration or engaged in illicit
activity while holding down legal jobs; not one interview participant mentioned not
wanting to work. Furthermore, it is possible that Mexicans who under these economic
constraints migrate to the US illegally sometimes fill those very jobs that the protag-
onists of these authors’ work are reticent to take up.
The findings on Mexico reveal that indeed offenders in this study were poor along
multiple dimensions, especially so in the educational dimension. The findings from the
study also point to important contrasts with some findings established in the Western
literature. First, leaving school to assume adult roles (becoming parents) does not
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decrease the likelihood of criminal engagement; rather what is seen amongst offenders
is a high incidence of adolescent pregnancy that results in young men assuming adult
roles since an early age. In this context, starting a family can constitute a catalyst for
criminal participation, partly due to a culture that still places a heavy burden on men
who are traditionally considered to be the main breadwinners. Secondly, the conspic-
uous consumption driven form the extra gains of the illicit economy are not used in the
purchase of a ‘street’ look, as illustrated in Anderson, Densley and Wright & Decker’s
work. Instead, in a context of glaring inequality such as Mexico (not to say that the US
does not suffer from high inequality, it is just a question of degree and Gini indices
clearly show that levels of inequality are higher in Latin America), young marginalized
men seek to imitate consumption patterns of the wealthy with the hope of reducing the
distance between themselves and the elite, or ultimately, to gain access to the social
group of elites that commands respect. The way that one earns respect across these
contexts is therefore inherently different: while the protagonists of the Western litera-
ture earn respect developing their own sense of style (the ‘street’ look), in Ciudad
Juarez this respect is instead drawn from mimicking the look of the elite. Lastly, access
to social welfare and higher wages in low-skilled employment was more readily
available in Western contexts, but there was reticence on behalf of some of the study
participants in this literature to engage in the legal economy. In Mexico, respondents in
this study had no access to a regular welfare program that provided food stamps,
resulting in a high proportion of food deprivation that Western counterparts did not
largely face. Participants in the Mexican context also faced significantly more obstacles
in legal employment due to low wages that were insufficient for meeting basic needs.
Limitations
In their ethnography of armed robbers, Wright and Decker criticize researchers who
have refused to work with offenders in their ‘natural habitat’ (outside the prison),
pointing out that there are biases to data collected in correctional settings. First, it is
possible that study participants may recall their life prior to incarceration in a more
positive light and secondly, respondents who had spent more time in jail may have had
more difficulty in recalling their circumstances prior to incarceration. The evidence
collected for this study did not indicate, however, that when asked about deprivations,
respondents recalled their experiences more positively, nor were there high rates of
non-response in the evaluation of poverty indicators that would have pointed to
difficulty in respondents’ ability to recall prior conditions.
In addition, there are several shortcomings with Wright and Decker’s criticism
concerning researchers’ reticence to work with offenders outside institutional settings. In
the first place, the authors produced an ethnography focusing exclusively on armed robbers.
In contrast, the range of crimes of participants in this study largely included homicide;
hence, my reticence to workwith this population in their natural environment. They also fail
to consider gender in their criticism overlooking that the risks for women who decide to do
research outside of an institutional setting, in offenders’ ‘natural environment’, are different.
Furthermore, as I have argued before, working in prison in a developing country cannot be
compared toworking in this same environment in a developed country. In instances of auto-
gobierno, or in prisons where officials are mired in deeply corrupt practices, as is the case in
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some prisons in Mexico, the lines between offenders and officials become blurry and
prisons come a step closer to offenders’ natural habitats.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to test Wacquant’s argument on the penalization of
poverty in the specific case of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, one of the cities most affected by
the recent ‘war on drugs’ declared by Felipe Calderon. The present analysis of multi-
dimensional poverty used in this study, based on the methodology that has been used for
the measurement of poverty in Mexico at the national, state and municipal levels since
2010 [18] but that has traditionally excluded institutionalized populations, confirms that
offenders are deprived on several dimensions. Because our understanding of poverty has
exclusively focused on income measurement, there is a tendency to assume that
experiences of poverty of people in prison are homogenous, when this is not necessarily
the case. The analysis showed that while offenders fared worse off in several dimensions
of poverty when compared to non-delinquents, there were also individuals who belong
to other categories of poverty and interviews revealed that experiences of poverty varied.
In addition, while the most common explanation for participation in organized crime
is economic in nature, the study reveals that while delinquents were less deprived in the
income dimension, participation in activities of this nature did not constitute an
effective nor sustained pathway out of poverty, as most respondents were still consid-
ered income poor and an important share were still vulnerable due to deprivation in
social indicators. The failure to escape poverty is due to a highly skewed distribution of
income in the illegal economy depending on the position in the organized criminal
hierarchy and the use of gains from illegal activity to fuel conspicuous consumption,
findings that are similar in the established Western literature. However, there are
important differences in the consumer goods purchased when compared across con-
texts: while in Juarez, imitation of consumption patterns of the elite to earn respect is
visible, qualitative work in Western settings reveals that respect is earned through the
creation of a ‘street’ style that stands in direct contrast to the middle and high classes.
This analysis also found that educational lagging is much more pervasive amongst
delinquents when compared to non-delinquents. Amongst delinquent sample respondents,
a dislike for school constitutes an important motivating factor for dropping out, despite
evidence that respondents performed well academically. This stands in contrast to the
established literature in the US which finds that those who drop out of school due to poor
academic achievement are more likely to participate in delinquent acts. On a more positive
note, the study finds evidence of lower shares of deprivation in access to social security
amongst both delinquent and non-delinquent respondents in comparison to deprivation at
the national level, which can be attributed to the pervasive character of assembly plant
employment which permeates the economic structure of Ciudad Juarez, and where access
to social security is guaranteed by employers despite meager wages. However, in contrast
to the Western literature, where protagonists have access to welfare in the form of food
stamps and higher remunerated low-skilled employment, this study finds high degrees of
deprivation in access to food amongst participants and wages in the legal economy that do
not meet basic living costs. These initial findings show that multidimensional poverty is a
useful framework to link penalization and poverty and to gain a more nuanced
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understanding of offenders’ experienced deprivations. In so doing, they point to the
relevance of building an evidence base around work in prisons in developing country
settings and particularly inMexico, as well as to question established assumptions that have
been based almost exclusively on evidence derived from Western settings.
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